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APOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONS:
EXPLORING AN EXAMPLE FROM
MEDICAL PRACTICE
Jonathan R. Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
In previous work, I examined the potential of apology in civil
lawsuits. There I argued that to better serve their clients, under
existing laws, lawyers should consider discussing the possibility of
apology with them more often. For example, many lawyers fail to
consider that offering an apology can greatly facilitate settlements
and that "safe" apologies, which cannot be used as proof in court,
can often be made within mediation. I also argued that in order to
encourage apologies after injury, we ought to consider reforming
our laws to exclude apologies from admissibility as evidence.1 In
this Article, I focus on injuries committed by members of organiza-
tions, such as corporations, and examine distinct issues raised by
apology in the organizational setting. In particular, I consider: (i)
the process of learning to prevent future errors; (ii) the divergent
interests stemming from principal-agent tensions in employment,
risk preferences and sources of insurance; (iii) the non-pecuniary
benefits to corporate morale, productivity and reputation; (iv) the
standing and scope of apologies; and (v) the articulation of policies
toward injuries to others.
I begin my analysis with an article published in the Philadelphia
Inquirer (the "Gerlin article"). The article reports about an atypi-
cal, and in some ways revolutionary, approach to instances of med-
ical error that the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington,
Kentucky (the "Lexington VA") initiated in 1987 and has followed
since. This hospital's approach and its effects have been docu-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law,
Gainesville, FL. A.B., 1987, J.D., 1992, Ph.D., 1993 (Harvard). I thank Bryan Liang,
Lars Noah, Barbara Noah, Tom Cotter, Clark Freshman, Christopher Guthrie, Jeff
Seul, Sharon Rush, Joe Jackson, Richard Pearson, Laurence Savett and Karl Singer
for their helpful comments and Shannon Reilly and Mark Caramanica for their valua-
ble research assistance. All errors are mine alone.
1. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv.
1004, 1009 (1999). See also Aviva Orenstein, Apology Expected: Incorporating A
Feminist Analysis Into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L.
REv. 221 (1999) (arguing for an independent evidentiary exclusion for apologies).
1447
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
mented subsequently by recent academic publications.2 I reprint
the newspaper account below, because it simultaneously offers an
overview of the hospital's approach and addresses many of the cen-
tral issues of apology and organizations.3 After the Gerlin article, I
supplement the framework established by her report with further
specific information obtained from academic publications and from
telephone interviews.4
A. Newspaper Account
Accepting Responsibility, by Policy5
by Andrea Gerlin
The Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington, Ky., han-
dles medical errors differently from most hospitals.
The 400-bed hospital does not simply encourage its staff to tell
patients and their families the truth about errors. It has a tough
policy that requires giving the information as soon as possible by
aggressively seeking out patients and families, even after dis-
charge if necessary. Beyond that, hospital employees persuade
the occasional reluctant victim to accept financial compensation.
"Almost every risk manager and attorney says, 'We always
tell the truth,"' said Steven Kraman, the hospital's chief of staff
and chairman of its risk-management committee. "But I don't
know of any other hospital that goes out and calls the family
when there's been an error."
2. See Steven S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty
May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963 (Dec. 1999); Albert W.
Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense?, 131 ANNALS OF IN-
TERNAL MED. 970 (Dec. 1999).
3. Descriptions of fully-litigated cases are commonly given in judicial opinions
and provide the "data" for much legal research. For cases that are settled through
negotiation or other non-adjudicatory processes, records are far rarer. Hence, to
study non-adjudicatory settlement, descriptions must be found elsewhere. Here we
are fortunate that the Lexington VA's experience is well and concisely described by
Gerlin's newspaper account and that Gerlin's account is confirmed by subsequent
academic publication.
4. I conducted telephone interviews with Dr. Steven Kraman, the hospital's chief
of staff and chair of its risk management committee; Attorney Ginny Hamm, the hos-
pital's counsel and a member of its risk management committee; and Nurse Connie
Johnson, a quality assurance nurse and a member of its risk management committee,
on December 6, 1999. I conducted further telephone interviews with Dr. Kraman and
Attorney Hamm on January 14, 2000 [hereinafter Telephone Interviews with Kraman,
Hamm & Johnson].
5. Andrea Gerlin, Accepting Responsibility, by Policy, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Sept. 14, 1999, at A18. Reprinted with permission from The Philadelphia Inquirer,
September 14, 1999.
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Is the VA Medical Center inviting its patients to sue it into
oblivion? Not really, hospital officials say. Rather, they say,
they are just accepting responsibility when they are at fault.
"Telling the truth is the right thing to do," said Connie John-
son, a clinical analyst and quality assurance nurse at the
hospital.
"The attorneys around here in Lexington used to think we
were crazy," said Ginny Hamm, the hospital lawyer. "But we
have an ultimate responsibility to the veterans and their
families."
The VA hospital in Kentucky has learned that doing the right
thing can also mean saving money. By going out of its way to be
open and honest with patients and their families, the hospital
has found that it is minimizing its legal exposure because fami-
lies are not as angry when they learn of a medical error.
Leonard J. Marcus, director of the Program for Health Care
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the Harvard School of
Public Health, has analyzed malpractice mediation sessions in
an effort to determine what plaintiffs really want.
Marcus concluded that most patients who are harmed by
medical errors want three things: an explanation of what hap-
pened; an apology from whoever was responsible; and an assur-
ance that changes have been made to prevent harm from being
done to someone else. Money seems to be a distant concern.
Lexington VA officials may have found a way out of the litiga-
tion thicket using this approach. The hospital's average total
payout for settlements has been about $180,000 a year over the
last decade, on eight to 10 cases in a typical year. The hospital
has reduced its claims payments from among the highest in the
178-hospital VA system to one of the lowest.
Hospital officials admit that they arrived at that point pain-
fully. In 1986, the hospital lost two malpractice lawsuits at trial,
costing it a total of $1.5 million in awards. For a government
facility that primarily treats older patients, whose claims usually
result in lower damages, that was an eye-opening sum. Kraman
was a defendant in one of the cases and said the outcomes for-
ever changed the hospital's approach.
Hospital officials now begin assembling dossiers and taking
testimony soon after incidents. Hamm said that as soon as they
determine that a mistake has occurred, they notify the patient or
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family members. If they believe harm has been done, rather
than evade the truth in an attempt to avoid liability, they advise
the family to hire a lawyer and they seek to quickly resolve the
problem with a fair settlement.
That is what they are doing with Lloyd Brown, a 77-year-old
veteran from Stanford, Ky. Last year, he temporarily lost sight
in his right eye. Brown had previously lost most of the vision in
his other eye to a cataract. His wife, Martha, said she called the
VA's triage hotline and left a message with a receptionist
describing the episode. No one ever called the Browns back be-
cause some messages were not being relayed by the triage
hotline.
Two more episodes and six weeks later, they went to the med-
ical center. A doctor there told them that an artery in the right
side of Lloyd Brown's neck had closed due to a stroke and that
he would be permanently blind in the affected eye. Worse, none
of that had to happen.
"They said that if we'd gotten it within four hours they could
have saved the eye," Martha Brown said. "We didn't think
about seeing a lawyer."
Three months later they received a letter from the hospital
advising them to get a lawyer so they could begin discussing a
settlement, which is pending. Kraman said the couple, touched
by having been dealt with honestly, became teary-eyed at the
meeting during which the hospital acknowledged its mistake.
VA officials have also been helping Lloyd Brown obtain full
disability benefits. The Browns are impressed: Lloyd Brown
even returned to the medical center this spring for treatment of
a heart problem.
"We think a lot of them," Martha Brown said. "They're taking
responsibility. I never had experience with it, but I've never
heard of a hospital admitting a mistake."
Kraman said the hospital drills its policy into its staff, espe-
cially the residents who train there, seeking to create a culture in
which mistakes are acknowledged and lead to changes that pre-
vent recurrences. Some of the ethics seminars it has held for em-
ployees have featured patients who were injured by treatment at
the hospital, explaining how honesty reinforced rather than un-
dermined their trust.
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As obvious as this approach seems, there are reasons that a
VA hospital can use it and that other hospitals will be slower to
follow. As government facilities, the VA's liability is limited
under the federal Tort Claims Act. Its hospitals are self-insured
and its physicians are employees, and do not pay higher mal-
practice insurance premiums after a costly settlement.
Still, Kraman and his colleagues argue that their approach
should be a model for other institutions.
"If everybody did this nationwide, every patient who was in-
jured would get fair compensation, the lawyers would get noth-
ing, and you wouldn't see $12 million verdicts," Kraman said.
B. Further Information
Before 1987, the Lexington VA's response toward instances of
medical error was an adversarial combination of little disclosure
and much opposition.6 In 1987, following failed defenses of two
malpractice claims that resulted in verdicts totaling $1.5 million,7
the Lexington VA implemented a policy of proactively assuming
responsibility for medical mistakes.8 The essence of the policy was
to maintain a care-giving relationship toward the patient following
medical error rather than adopting an adversarial one.9
6. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
7. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964.
8. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
9. In 1999, the Lexington VA formally adopted a policy on "Patient Safety (Inte-
grated Risk Management Program)", VAMC Memorandum No. 00-1, VA Medical
Center, Lexington, Kentucky, Nov. 4, 1999. Telephone Interviews with Kraman,
Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. Posted on easels at the hospital's entrances are ex-
cerpts including:
2. PHILOSOPHY: Human error is inevitable, even among the most consci-
entious professionals practicing the highest standard of care. Identification
and reporting of adverse events, including those that result from practitioner
error, are critical to our efforts to continuously improve patient safety. Like-
wise, medical managers have a duty to recognize the inevitability of human
error and attempt to design systems that make such error less likely; and to
avoid punitive reactions to honest errors.
3. POLICY: Key components of the patient safety/risk management policy
and approach are:
a. All employees and practitioners are responsible for fully cooperating in
efforts to improve patient safety and eradicate potential risks. This includes
the reporting of events which result in actual or potential injury to a patient.
b. Patients and their families will be informed about injuries resulting
from adverse events and the options available to them.
c. The Risk Management Committee is [the] hub of responsibility for pa-
tient safety activity. This includes overseeing the investigation, reporting
2000] 1451
1452 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
The policy involved multiple steps. The hospital encouraged
workers to report mistakes to its risk management committee,
which included Dr. Steven Kraman, the hospital's chief of staff and
chair of the risk management committee, and Ginny Hamm, the
hospital's in-house counsel. Once a mistake was reported,10 a typi-
cal case proceeded as follows. The committee rapidly investigated
the mistake and attempted to determine its root cause. If the root
cause was deemed "systemic," efforts at systemic reform were un-
dertaken.1' If the mistake resulted in harm to the patient, irrespec-
tive of whether the patient was aware of it, the patient was
informed of the error. In some cases, the patient was not aware
nor likely would have become aware of the mistake absent the hos-
pital volunteering the information.' 2 The risk management com-
mittee then brainstormed about ways to aid the patient through
further medical treatment, disability benefits and compensation. 13
and analysis of patient safety and adverse event data as well as orchestrating
family notifications and interventions when warranted.
While the approach of assuming responsibility for errors was implemented in practice
in 1987, the Lexington VA did not formally articulate this policy until November,
1999. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm, & Johnson, supra note 4. For a
discussion of the delay, see infra text accompanying notes 114-119.
10. As the policy became established, the prevalence of reporting increased so
that often an error was reported by multiple sources. Telephone Interviews with
Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. Such multiple-source reporting no doubt
provides an incentive for the person who has committed the error to report it directly
and promptly.
11. A mistake was deemed "systemic" if another individual in the same circum-
stances would have been likely to have committed the same error. Telephone Inter-
views with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. For example, on one occasion,
after a patient received the wrong dilution of the medication herapin, it was discov-
ered that dilutions of different strengths (1:1000 and 1:10000) were stored in the phar-
macy on the same shelf next to one in highly similar bottles. Changes to prevent
future confusion (e.g., using differently colored bottles and putting bottles of different
dosages on different shelves) were then made. Since the adoption of their new policy,
the hospital has "fixed" several systems based upon such analysis. Id. See infra text
accompanying note 79 (discussing a similar instance of poor medication labeling at
Kaiser Permanente in Denver); see infra text accompanying notes 69 - 80 (on the need
for systemic approaches to the prevention of such medical errors).
12. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964 ("Since this policy has been in
place .... [f]ive settlements involved incidents that caused permanent injury or death
but would probably never have resulted in a claim without voluntary disclosure to the
patients or families.").
13. While the hospital fully discloses all errors that cause harm to the patient, after
much careful deliberation, the hospital decided that, where the mistake does not re-
sult in harm to the patient (i.e., "harmless error"), the hospital would not inform the
patient of the mistake. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra
note 4. (The description by Kraman & Hamm of error reporting does not address the
harmless error scenario. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964). Dr. Albert Wu
critiques this position suggesting that, "Even if the mistake did not result in an ad-
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The committee arranged a meeting between itself, the patient and
anyone the patient wished to bring, usually family members and an
attorney.'4 If the risk management committee believed that the
hospital or its employees had been at fault, Dr. Kraman apologized
to the patient at that meeting, including admitting fault verbally
and, if the patient desired, subsequently in writing. 15 Members of
the committee then discussed further steps the hospital could take
to aid the patient medically and any disability benefits to which the
patient might be entitled.1 6 In cases where the risk management
committee believed the hospital or its employees had been at fault,
the committee made what it believed to be a fair settlement offer.17
Typically, settlement ensued rapidly. 8
From the financial viewpoint, the new approach of assuming re-
sponsibility, including apology, passed the Hippocratic test: it ap-
pears to have done the hospital no financial harm and may have
done some financial good. Recall that in 1985 and 1986 the hospi-
tal paid two malpractice verdicts that together totaled $1.5 mil-
lion.19 From 1990 through 1996, the hospital paid an average of
only $190,113 per year in malpractice claims, with an average
(mean) payment of $15,622 per claim. 20 This placed the Lexington
VA in the lowest quartile of thirty-six comparable VA hospitals for
malpractice payments and in the bottom sixth in terms of average
liability payment per claim. 2' As Kraman and Haemn modestly put
verse outcome, I still recommend that the near miss be disclosed." Wu, supra note 2,
at 971; see infra text accompanying notes 108-113.
14. Dr. Kraman, Attorney Hamm and Nurse Johnson represented the hospital at a
typical meeting. The employee who committed the error (e.g., the negligent physi-
cian) did not usually appear. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 108-
113.
15. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Kraman estimated that, following the apology and the settlement offer, "nine
out of ten cases settled very rapidly." Id.
19. Though I have not seen other pre-1987 data, these two verdicts totaling $1.5
million may be "outliers," greatly exceeding the average payment in pre-1987 years.
Hence, some caution is warranted in comparing the 1990 to 1996 results with those
two verdicts.
20. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964. In their published study, Kraman
& Hamm report on the years 1990 through 1996 because data for comparable VA
hospitals was only available for those years. However, the data for the Lexington VA
for other years since the adoption of the new policy (i.e., 1987 through 1989 and 1997
through 1999) are similar. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson,
supra note 4.
21. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 965 (the latter statistic is derived from
a comparison of the tables).
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it, "[Under the policy of assuming responsibility], the Lexington
facility's liability payments have been moderate and are compara-
ble to those of similar facilities. 22
This may understate the overall financial benefits of the new pol-
icy for it overlooks savings in litigation costs. Under the new pol-
icy, most cases settled rapidly, and rapid settlement undoubtedly
reduced expenses generated by litigation (e.g., legal fees, employee
time, expert witness fees). Based upon an accounting of an earlier
case, Kraman and Hamm estimated that apart from the ultimate
award the hospital incurred roughly $250,000 in other expenses for
a single case litigated through the appellate level.24 By fostering
rapid settlement, the new policy helped avoid such litigation costs.
During the period of their study (1990-1996), "[s]even claims pro-
ceeded to federal court and were dismissed before trial. One claim
proceeded to trial and was won by the government [VA]." 25 If
Kraman and Hamm's estimate that a single case litigated through
the appellate level entailed $250,000 in legal expenses is even
roughly accurate, then the decreased expenses through rapid settle-
ment were likely significant sources of savings due to the new pol-
icy. In short, it appears that the approach of "assuming
responsibility" helped rather than harmed the financial "bottom
line" of the Lexington VA.
Other parts of the VA system have begun to take notice. In
1995, the Department of Veterans Affairs adopted a risk manage-
ment policy toward medical errors resulting in injury. The policy
required that, "the medical center will inform the patient and/or
the family,... [offer appropriate medical treatment] ... [and fur-
ther] "inform[ ] the patient and/or family of their right to... Appli-
cation for Compensation and Pension . . . or to file an
administrative tort claim."'26 Within the past few years, two other
VA hospitals have adopted the Lexington model.27
22. Id. at 965-66.
23. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
24. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966; see also Henry S. Farber &
Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medi-
cal Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 778 (1994) (indicating markedly lower legal
expenses for medical complaints settled early within informal processes).
25. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964.
26. Id. (quoting Patient Safety Improvement, Department of Veteran Affairs, VHA
Manual 1051/1 (1998)).
27. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
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C. Preliminary Observations
Before further discussing the Lexington VA's experience, several
observations are in order. First, the rules governing liability for
VA hospitals and their employees differ from those of their private
sector counterparts. As Gerlin's article mentions, VA hospitals are
government organizations, and malpractice actions against VA hos-
pitals must be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FICA"). There are procedural and substantive differences be-
tween such claims and ordinary malpractice actions. 28 Procedur-
ally, claims brought under the FTCA are heard by a federal bench
trial, which has no jury, and only after administrative remedies
have been exhausted.29 Substantively, while state law governs the
claim, there is no possibility of punitive damages under the
FTCA.3° This substantive bar on punitive damages, along with the
distinct procedural rules, certainly reduces the liability exposure of
VA hospitals compared to private hospitals.3 Note, however, that
the presence of punitive damages in the private sector may actually
help promote the use of apology in that sector. A private sector
injurer may apologize in an effort to avert punitive damages.
A physician employed by the VA is also in a very different posi-
tion from his private sector counterpart. As a VA employee, she
has virtually no personal exposure for malpractice.32 Unlike her
private sector counterpart, the VA physician will also experience
no increase in her medical malpractice premiums following a suc-
cessful malpractice suit, because she need not carry any. Her error,
however, can be reported for certain licensing purposes and, in re-
peat or egregious cases, can result in dismissal or the loss of medi-
cal license.33 In short, the VA physician faces far less personal
28. See Thomas K. Kruppstadt, Determining Whether a Physician is an Independ-
ent Contractor in a Medical Malpractice Action Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47
BAYLOR L. REv. 223, 226 (1995).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
31. Though admitting the comparison's imprecision, Kraman and Hamm suggest
that VA hospitals face roughly half the liability exposure of their private sector coun-
terparts on a given claim. "It is difficult to accurately compare the Veterans Affairs
experience with that of the private sector, but [comparisons of U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statics reports] indicate[ ] that [in the early 1990's] the average medical malpractice
judgment in the private sector ($1,484,000) is considerably greater than that in the
Veterans Affairs system ($720,000)." Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966.
32. See Kruppstadt, supra note 28, at 226.
33. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966.
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exposure than her private sector counterpart.34 Note, however,
that while the Lexington VA and its employees enjoy certain pro-
tections under the FTCA that their private counterparts do not, the
Lexington VA is on a level "legal playing field" vis A vis the other
VA hospitals in the Kraman and Hamm study.
Second, while apology is an aspect of the Lexington VA's ap-
proach to medical mistakes, it is but one piece of an overall system
of response. The overall system might be called "assuming respon-
sibility for errors." Defense attorneys commonly assist defendants
in denying responsibility for their mistakes .3  By contrast, the Lex-
ington VA embraced responsibility. Beyond the single act of apol-
ogy, the broader orientation of accepting responsibility was reflec-
ted in acts such as offering fair compensation for injuries, attempt-
ing to prevent similar mistakes in the future, and developing chan-
nels for open, direct communication. 36 This general posture fits
with VA's historical mission and organizational philosophy of car-
ing for veterans. 7
Third is the matter of equity in patient compensation. Putting
aside for the moment the issue of the overall level of liability pay-
ments to patients, the Lexington VA's approach of assuming re-
sponsibility may also have produced more equitable results than
the "lottery" of litigation that could ensue more often from a com-
bative approach. A critique of our current malpractice liability sys-
tem is that, as a means for compensating patients for medical
errors, litigation is highly sporadic a.3  Most cases of medical mal-
practice go undetected, 39 and even once detected, jury awards fre-
34. For an overview of legal and financial incentives in private health care, focus-
ing particularly on limited liability faced by managed care organizations because of
ERISA provisions and how such provisions influence patient care, see Bryan A. Li-
ang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (1998)[hereinafter
Liang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law].
35. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1009-10, 1042-46.
36. For an apology to "work," the injured party generally must perceive it as sin-
cere. See id. at 1017-18. By coupling the apology with what it believed was a fair offer
of compensation, the Lexington VA "put its money where its mouth was." Such ac-
tion no doubt promoted the belief by the injured party that the apology was sincere.
37. See 38 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
38. See generally PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDI-
CAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993). For
references to more recent works, see David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States
Afford A "No-Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury, 60 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 2 (1997).
39. See, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims
and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Malpractice
Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) (analyzing a study of 31,429 patient
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quently fail to reflect the underlying merits of the case. 4° By
contrast, I suspect that the new policy helped produce more equita-
ble results across patient awards and fairer results in terms of tying
compensation to the actual merits of the individual case. Not only
were patients more likely to learn of medical errors under the new
policy,41 but there was also a high probability of a moderate level
of settlement then ensuing. Out of the thirty-six comparable VA
hospitals, the Lexington VA was the among the fifth highest in
terms of the number of claims against it but among the lowest sixth
in terms of liability payment per claim.42 Compare these results
with a litigious model, where the polar outcomes of either a large
award or no award commonly ensues. Under the new policy, most
cases settled quickly, in Kraman and Hamm's assessment, at mod-
erate levels of compensation based upon "reasonable calculations
of actual loss."'43 While one cannot draw definitive conclusions
about either the distribution of payments or the merits of individ-
ual payments from such aggregate statistics and such a subjective
assessment," it is probable that the new approach promoted
greater equity between cases and greater fairness in an individual
case. If so, then these too are laudable achievements.
A question arises as to whether the Lexington VA's possible cost
savings are fairly attributable to their adoption of the assuming re-
sponsibility approach. For example, could the statistics placing the
Lexington VA in the lowest quartile for total claims payments and
the lowest sixth for average payment per claim have resulted from
factors other than its approach of assuming responsibility, includ-
records finding malpractice claims were filled in less than two percent of cases in
which medical negligence caused injury to a patient).
40. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events
and Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1966
(1996) (analyzing a study of 51 malpractice suits finding that malpractice awards were
correlated only with the severity of plaintiff's disability and not with the provider's
negligence). See generally Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments to
U.S. Reform, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1, 28-38 (1999) [hereinafter Liang, Error
in Medicine] (surveying shortcomings of the American malpractice liability and sug-
gesting alternatives); Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing
Medical Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient, Physician, and Attorney,
S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming).
41. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 964.
42. See id. at 965.
43. Id. at 964.
44. The statistics reported in Kraman & Hamm are aggregate statistics (e.g., show-
ing means and frequencies). While some inferences about the distribution's shape
may be drawn from them, as they do not give precise information on the shape of the
underlying distribution of data, these are probable inferences, but by no means cer-
tainties. See id. at 965.
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ing apology, for medical errors?45 Might it simply be that the Lex-
ington VA committed fewer, less serious errors during this period
than the other hospitals? These are certainly valid questions. The
Lexington VA's experience may have resulted from many possible
causes, and, as a single case study, its results are subject to multiple
interpretations.46 Yet, while such concerns should be recognized,
they should not be overemphasized. The data appear to show that
the Lexington VA's new policy of assuming responsibility, includ-
ing apology, did not harm and may have helped the hospital finan-
cially. One cannot say for certain that this is so, but this seems to
be a reasonable conclusion.
Many lawyers see only the obvious economic risks to apology
but overlook the possible economic benefits.47 Stepping back for a
moment from the example of the Lexington VA, two reasons apol-
ogy can be economically beneficial to the apologizer are as fol-
lows. 48 First, in some cases injured parties may refrain from suing
if they receive an apology. Often a "vicious cycle" exists where
following an error, an injurer (e.g., physician) wants to apologize
but refrains from doing so out of fear of legal liability, and it is
precisely this absence of an apology that triggers the lawsuit.4 9 For
example, one study found that twenty-four percent of the families
who sued their physicians following prenatal injuries filed medical
malpractice claims when "they realized that physicians had failed
to be completely honest with them about what happened, allowed
them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled
them. '50 While there are some patients who say that they would
45. Id. at 964-66.
46. The Kraman and Hamm study is at root a descriptive study using comparative
data, rather than a casual study testing hypothesis through methods such as experi-
mentation. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2.
47. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1042-46.
48. Some other reasons that apologizing following injury can be economically ben-
eficial to the injurer, such as facilitating error prevention, are discussed below. Note
that apologies also can offer non-economic benefits to the apologizer such as helping
to repair a damaged relationship or alleviate guilt.
49. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1011-12.
50. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Mal-
practice Claims Following Prenatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992). In addi-
tion, 19% said they filed suit because of the "desire to deter subsequent malpractice
by the physician and/or seek revenge," concerns that may also have been met by apol-
ogy. Id. See also Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of
Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994) (finding
that 377 British patients and their families might not have brought malpractice suits
had there been a full explanation and apology - and arguing that these are more
significant factors than monetary compensation in determining whether to file a suit).
For other related references, see Cohen, supra note 1, at 1011 n.7.
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not have sued if they had received an apology but in fact would
have, surely there are some patients who can be taken at their
word.51 Second, an apology can greatly facilitate the settlement
process and thereby reduce settlement costs. 5 2 An apology often
cannot substitute for compensation for the injury but can be a way
of avoiding compounding insult upon the injury-insult that can
prevent settlement.
I am not reducing apologies to mere matters of economics or
suggesting that parties make insincere apologies solely for strategic
advantage. Apology should be rooted in responsibility and re-
morse rather than in economics and strategy. It is the ethical re-
sponse to injuring another, irrespective of the economic
consequences. However, I think that parties often fail to make
apologies out of their fear of adverse economic consequences and
thereby fail to seriously consider both the potential risks and bene-
fits of apology.53 As VA hospital lawyer Ginny Hamm described,
"The attorneys around here in Lexington used to think we were
crazy [when we initiated our new policy]. ' 54 As one who studies
the possible benefits and risks of apology, I can attest that many
attorneys and legal academics greet the idea that apology can fi-
nancially benefit the apologizer with much skepticism. The Lex-
ington VA's experience helps refute the skeptic's view that apology
necessarily entails financial suicide. Rather, it indicates the oppo-
site: apology can be to the apologizer's financial benefit.
51. The experience of one of my colleagues illustrates this poignantly. His first-
born son, who recently died, was born with a rare metabolic disease. When he was
fourteen months old, the child suffered a stroke and developed persistent seizures, the
prevention of which required very high doses of powerful anti-convulsant medica-
tions. Several weeks into the child's hospitalization for the stroke and seizures, my
colleague, who was then a law professor, received a telephone call at work from the
doctor in charge of his son's care. The doctor instructed my colleague to come to the
hospital as soon as possible. When my colleague arrived, the doctor informed him
that the child had slipped into a coma and that it probably happened as a result of an
accidental overdose of the anti-convulsant medication. He then apologized for the
incident. Fortunately, the child survived the mishap. Upon hearing these events, I
asked my colleague whether the physician's apology made any difference. His re-
sponse was simple:
Because the doctor apologized, we would never have sued. Everyone is
human. In fact, the fact that he was honest gave us greater confidence in his
future evaluations and recommendations concerning my son's care. But if
he hadn't been honest - if he had denied the mistake and I had somehow
found out later - I would have considered suing him because it would have
raised doubt about my son's entire course of care.
52. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1019-23.
53. See id. at 1022-23.
54. Gerlin, supra note 5.
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One may ask whether other organizations, particularly private
organizations, can achieve cost savings by adopting this approach
of assuming responsibility, including apology and fair offers of
compensation. At this point, I think the best one can say is that
this is an open question, which is itself a significant statement. As
noted above, under the FTCA, the Lexington VA faces reduced
liability exposure when apologizing as compared to a private hospi-
tal or other private organization, which may in part help explain
the willingness of the Lexington VA to apologize. However, even
in the private sector, an approach of assuming responsibility by an
organizational defendant can yield surprising results.
Consider the experience of the Toro Company ("Toro"), a major
manufacturer of lawn care products including power mowers,
blowers and trimmers. Toro is subject to many personal injury
claims, roughly one hundred and twenty five annually. For years,
"Toro handled all lawsuits filed against it by immediately referring
them to outside counsel to be aggressively defended. [The strat-
egy, said] Toro's assistant general counsel James Seifert, could be
summed up as 'litigate everything'. 56 In 1991, Toro decided in-
stead to respond to claims in a non-confrontational manner by of-
fering to mediate them.5 7 In mediation, after exchanging essential
information about the claim, Toro's counsel would typically express
sympathy for the claimant's injury and then make what Toro saw as
a fair offer of settlement. Note, however, that while Toro com-
monly expressed sympathetic words, it appears that Toro typically
did not apologize in the sense of admitting its own fault.58
Despite much initial skepticism from the defense bar,59 the net
result was that under this new approach Toro settled claims far
more rapidly and at far less cost. Pre-1991, the average lifespan of
a claim from filing until settlement or verdict was twenty-four
months, whereas from 1992 to 1996, the average lifespan was four
55. J. Stratton Shartel, Toro's Mediation Program Challenges Wisdom of Tradi-
tional Litigation Model, 9 INSIDE LITIGATION 10 (June 1995).
56. Id.
57. John J. Upchurch, Pre-Litigation Resolution of Claims through Early Interven-
tion/Mediation, THE REVOLUTIONIZING LITIGATION MANAGEMENT REPORT, June,
1995, at 9; see also John D. McKinnon, Cutting Legal Fees, FLORIDA TREND, May
1996, at 27 (describing Toro's adoption of mediation "as a way of trimming its fast-
growing litigation cost"); Miguel A. Olivella, Jr., The Toro Company's Early Interven-
tion ADR Program at 3 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished paper on file with Fordham Urban
Law Journal) (describing the adoption of a "pre-litigation intervention program that
featured mediation as the cornerstone of claims disposition").
58. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
59. See Olivella, supra note 57, at 4.
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months. Pre-1991, the average payout per claim on both verdicts
and settlements was $68,368. From 1992 to 1996, it was only
$18,594. Pre-1991, the average costs and fees per claim were
$47,252. From 1992 to 1996, they were only $12,023. In sum,
Toro's average total cost per claim fell from $115,620 to $30,617,
saving Toro $54,329,840 during that period. In addition, Toro
saved on insurance costs. 60 Based upon the documented liability
savings following the adoption of the new program, Toro's liability
insurance premiums were reduced by $1.8 million per year for
three years, after which Toro opted to self-insure.6' The savings
have continued beyond 1996. Toro's counsel Miguel Olivella, Jr.
estimates that by 1999, the Toro company saved over $75 million
from the new approach to settlement that it had adopted in 1991.
Several comparisons between Toro's program and that of the
Lexington VA should be made. First, Toro attempts to settle their
cases within mediation. This setting frequently provides statutory
confidentiality protection. Further, Toro insists upon written confi-
dentiality agreements designed to exclude statements made within
the mediation from admission in court. As with the Lexington VA,
here too is a case where special legal provisions, though of a differ-
ent sort, help to promote settlement. Second, the cost savings in
legal fees per claim were considerable, falling by seventy-four per-
cent from $47,252 to $12,023. In the Lexington VA case, the data
on decreased litigation costs were far less precise; however, Toro's
experience is suggestive of how significant rapid settlement can be
in reducing litigation costs. Third, unlike the Lexington VA, Toro
does not usually apologize in the sense of admitting fault during
the mediation. Consider the words of Mr. Olivella,
Apology to an injured claimant has been something I do from
the beginning [of the mediation]. It lets the claimant know that
despite the accident's fault, no one takes any pleasure in know-
ing that a human being has been injured, seemingly putting the
claimant more at ease when he discovers that the company is
not the cold, cruel evil empire he may have thought we were. In
the context of a mediation, it is possible to act in such a fashion
without it being a sign of weakness.62
60. See id. at 12-13. Based on such remarkable results, Toro's program received in
1994 the Center for Public Resource's Institute for Dispute Resolution Significant
Practical Achievement Award. See Shartel, supra note 55, at 10.
61. Olivella, supra note 57, at 9.
62. Electronic correspondence from Miguel A. Olivella, Jr. to Jonathan R. Cohen
(Dec. 3, 1999).
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Some may describe this statement as crafty. By strongly expres-
sing sympathy, the statement gives the claimant the feeling of hav-
ing been apologized to without an actual admission of Toro's fault.
I, however, do not see it as fundamentally duplicitous. Unlike the
Lexington VA, Toro typically has limited information about the
cause(s) of the accident. Whereas the Lexington VA has access to
most of the relevant factual information concerning its role in a
malpractice claim, Toro often does not. Hence, even if Toro sought
to admit its fault fully at the commencement of the mediation, it
would be difficult to know exactly what Toro should admit.
Rather, I would suggest that Mr. Olivella's statement, though loose
in its use of the word "apology," is suggestive of a richer sense of
humanity63 and perhaps a more complex understanding of respon-
sibility64 than is seen in most litigation.
Professor Owen Fiss has argued that justice is what takes place in
a courtroom and that the settlement process is an inferior substi-
tute, "a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets...
[and] a capitulation to the conditions of mass society [that] should
be neither encouraged nor praised."65 Yet our current system of
litigation is largely based upon parties denying responsibility, and
thus forcing the opposing party to prove one's fault rather than
directly accepting responsibility and admitting those acts that one
understands to be one's fault. By apologizing, parties assume re-
sponsibility for their mistakes rather than denying it. If the injurer
is willing to apologize, surely this is the preferable path. Further,
our legal system usually leads to dichotomized understandings of
rights, bifurcating responsibility when it can be more just to appor-
tion the responsibility.' Settlement discussions, by contrast, fre-
quently produce understandings of shared and partial
responsibility. Perhaps Mr. Olivella's statement, "despite the acci-
dent's fault," reflects a more complex understanding of responsibil-
ity, and hence of justice, than is found in most litigation.
It is easy to be "hard-nosed" and reflexively conclude without
evaluation that approaches of assuming responsibility for injuries,
63. Id. ("[N]o one takes any pleasure in knowing that a human being has been
injured, seemingly putting the claimant more at ease when he discovers that the com-
pany is not the cold, cruel evil empire he may have thought we were.").
64. Id. (observing that, through mediation, Toro acknowledges "despite the acci-
dent's fault").
65. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
66. See John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise - The Uses of
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964); John E. Coons, Compromise as
Precise Justice, 68 CAL. L. REv. 250 (1980).
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including apology, increase legal expenses. The Lexington VA's
experience is one striking example where accepting, rather than
denying, responsibility for errors, including making a fault-admit-
ting apology, was financially viable, if not beneficial.67 While Toro
does not typically make fault-admitting apologies, its response of
accepting financial responsibility in mediation rather that denying
it through litigation has produced tremendous economic savings
for Toro. Such experiences should make even the most "hard-
nosed" skeptic take a second look at the potential economic bene-
fits to the injurer of accepting responsibility for injuries, including
apology. While the best motives for responsible approaches, in-
cluding apology, are not financial, for those driven solely by finan-
cial considerations, the question is not whether such approaches
can save money, but where and when they can.68
67. Some may question whether the aforementioned reports on the experiences of
the Lexington VA and the Toro Corporation could be biased due to the sources of the
reports. The main report of the Lexington VA's experience was written by Kraman
and Hamm, who were also central in creating and implementing the hospital's new
policy. Similarly, some of the reports on Toro come from Miguel Olivella, Jr., who
was central in creating and implementing Toro's program. That said, independent
sources help confirm both accounts: Kraman and Hamm's article was subject to peer
review; both the Lexington VA and Toro were reported in journalistic accounts; and
Toro received a national award for its program.
Perhaps the concern about possible bias should be applied to this paper as well.
Below, I use the Lexington VA's experience as a springboard for speculating about
the possible effects - and generally positive effects - of apology in the organiza-
tional setting. In so doing, I have tried to be objective. However, as one who believes
in the potential of apology, perhaps what I "see" in the data, especially when some of
that data is anecdotal rather than statistical, may too be biased. For example, while
Kraman and Hamm believe, based upon their experience, that the hospital's new ap-
proach of apology helped reduce future mistakes, they have no "hard data" to con-
firm this. Rather, they simply mention instances in which systemic reforms were
made following investigations of errors. They cannot say for certain that such reforms
would not have been made absent the approach of assuming responsibility. See Tele-
phone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4. Hence, I stress that
below I offer conjectures about some organizational dimensions of apology. Evaluat-
ing the validity of such conjectures awaits further research.
68. Elsewhere, I have argued that we ought to consider reforming our laws to
exclude apologies from admissibility as evidence and thus encourage, rather than dis-
courage, apologies after injury. See Cohen, supra note 1. See also Orenstein, supra
note 1. The experiences of the Lexington VA and Toro help to support this argument.
The Lexington VA's fault-admitting apologies and the Toro company's apologetic ex-
pressions of sympathy both arose in contexts where the liability exposure engendered
when making such statements was limited as compared to typical litigation by particu-
lar legal rules, viz., the FTCA and mediation confidentiality provisions respectively.
This is not to discount the significance of the actions of the Lexington VA or Toro.
Rather it is to say that creating more "safe" havens whereby an apology could not be
used as evidence in court against the apologizer (e.g., creating an independent eviden-
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I. LEARNING TO PREVENT FUTURE ERRORS
There can be little doubt that organizations are more likely than
individuals to commit multiple, serious injuries over time. This is
not a statement about the morality or intentions of organizations
but simply a reflection of their size. Consider car accidents. Indi-
viduals involved in more than twenty accidents over their lifetime
are rare. By contrast, a large organization with a fleet of vehicles,
such as the U.S. postal service, may be involved in thousands of
accidents each year. A doctor may be considered unfortunate if he
is sued even once for malpractice in a given year, but the hospital
at which he works may expect to receive dozens of such suits
annually.
This basic difference raises a possible collateral benefit of apol-
ogy in the organizational setting: learning to prevent future er-
rors.69 Both individuals and organizations can learn from their
errors, but with organizations, the possibility of preventing future
errors and lawsuits is much greater. Errors frequently stem from
internal deficiencies and can afford particularly valuable learning
experiences. 70 For example, in the nuclear power and aviation in-
dustries, extensive investigations of accidents and "near misses"
are undertaken with the central aim being to undercover systemic
tiary exclusion for apologies) would likely help foster apology and thus promote
settlement.
How exactly the use of such mechanisms bears upon the sincerity of the apology is
a more complex question. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1067-68 (arguing that apolo-
gies made within "safe havens" can be both sincere and ethically acceptable, provided
that both sides understand that the apology is offered within such a mechanism). Cf
Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135(2000). While there is merit in the concern that apologizing within a "safe" mecha-
nism may "cheapen" the moral act of apology, it should be noted that, where an
apology is offered within a "safe" mechanism, (a) the injured party can and should
take note of the context in which the apology is offered, and (b) the apologizer always
has the option of making an offer of financial compensation along with the apology.
Thus, "safe" mechanisms increase the modes of communication available to the par-
ties. Absent such "safe" mechanisms, we are more likely to witness the vicious cycle
discussed above whereby the injurer fails to apologize out of fear of liability and it is
precisely the absence of the apology that triggers the lawsuit.
69. The cost of medical errors is tremendous and has recently received much at-
tention. See To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T.
Kohn et al., eds., 1999)(reporting studies estimating that between 44,000 and 98,000
Americans die each year from medical errors, which is more than from motor vehicle
accidents, breast cancer or AIDS).
70. On evaluating the sources of medical error, see id. at 42-48 (distinguishing be-
tween "active" errors and "latent" or systemic errors stressing the need to reduce the
latter); see also Liang, Error in Medicine, supra note 40.
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problems and thereby prevent future errors.71 As part of its ap-
proach of "assuming responsibility," the Lexington VA undertook
a "root cause" analysis once an error was reported and, on multiple
occasions, implemented systemic changes to prevent such future
errors.
72
What exactly is the link between apology and preventing future
errors? Could an organization fully investigate errors and under-
take systemic reforms without embracing an external apology?
While such investigation and reform are possible without apology,
I believe that they are facilitated by apology. As an act of external
honesty, openness and humility, apology can facilitate the same in-
ternally and thus promote change. When an organization adopts
the stance of assuming responsibility for its errors, its members are
likely to be more prompt in reporting errors,73 more honest in in-
vestigating them, and more willing to embrace reform. Common
wisdom suggests that "you can't fix a problem until you admit you
have one." I believe this applies both to individuals and to organi-
zations. The converse may also be true. Organizations that deny
or "cover up" problems may face difficulties not only in correcting
those errors but in maintaining internally honest communication.
Further, they risk damaging corporate morale.
Often members of organizations fail to report the errors they
commit internally to their superiors and externally to those they
harm. For example, one study found that "[hlouse officers re-
ported discussing the mistake with the supervising attending physi-
cian in only 54% of cases ... [and] discussed the mistake with the
patient or patient's family in only 24% of cases."'7 4 No doubt, part
of this failure is motivated by liability concerns. A doctor may cor-
rectly think, "If I tell either the patient or my boss about the mis-
take I made, that admission will just come back to be used against
me in court, but if I keep it to myself, I may well get away with it."
Such concerns have led to the arguments that we should consider
71. See Liang, Error in Medicine, supra note 40, at 28-31. As with nuclear power
and aviation, medical errors arise within complex systems and can result in grave
consequences.
72. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
73. For errors to be properly investigated, prompt reporting is best so that the
investigation can begin when people's memories are fresh and the equipment is still in
place.
74. Albert Wu et al., Do House Officers Learn from Their Mistakes?, 265 JAMA
2089, 2092 (1991).
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excluding both internal reports of medical errors and external apol-
ogies from admissibility in court.75
Putting aside the question of whether the legal rules about the
admissibility of such internal reports and external apologies should
be changed, my suspicion is that when an organization expresses its
willingness to accept the responsibility for errors, its employees be-
come more willing to report their own errors and those of their co-
workers. Just as external denial may breed internal denial, exter-
nal responsibility may breed internal responsibility. By accepting
responsibility for its errors, including apology, the Lexington VA
implicitly gave its employees a message that, "It's okay for you to
be open when you err, for we will be open with that information.
We aren't going to hide it, so you need not either." The hospital's
experience reflected this. Since the hospital initiated its new ap-
proach in 1987, there has not been, in the risk management com-
mittee's assessment, a single non-frivolous malpractice claim
against the hospital where the hospital did not first learn of the
medical mistake through internal reporting.76
Apology may also help enlist the injured party's involvement in
the error reduction process. Sometimes injured parties will have
information relevant to or ideas about error prevention that they
are unwilling to share absent an apology. Suppose that an organi-
zation is trying to correct an internal pattern of sexual harassment.
While the organization could attempt to correct the problem with-
out input of those who have been harassed, such input would be
highly valuable, and absent an apology, that input may be much
more difficult to obtain. Just as organizations have an incentive to
prevent future injuries, so do those who are injured. Apology can
be critical to building a "team" approach to error prevention be-
tween the injurer and the injured.
To some, the possibility that openly admitting mistakes and ac-
cepting responsibility for them, including apology, could decrease
legal costs, or the possibility that the evidentiary immunization of
reports of medical error could decrease the level of medical error
seems counterintuitive. The key is the difference between short-
75. On internal reports of medical errors, see Liang, Error in Medicine, supra note
40, at 39-43 (indicating that such internally reported information will often be discov-
erable in subsequent litigation despite the peer review privilege and arguing for legal
reforms to ensure the confidentiality of such information); see also To ERR 1S
HUMAN, supra note 69, at 94-113; Cohen, supra note 1 (arguing for consideration of
evidentiary reforms to exclude apologies from admissibility to prove fault in court);
Orenstein, supra note 1.
76. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
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run effects and long-run dynamics, dynamics that include the possi-
bility of learning. For example, suppose that society wishes to de-
crease the incidence of an undesirable event like medical
malpractice. How can this best be achieved? Generally speaking,
the "legal" approach is to sanction instances of that undesirable
event: when a doctor commits an error, punish him. By doing so,
the law gives doctors a strong incentive to avoid committing errors.
In essence, such reasoning is rooted in a static microeconomic per-
spective: if one raises the price (i.e., expected cost, including the
chance of detection and the level of punishment) of malpractice,
doctors will commit less of it.
The world, however, is dynamic. While sanctioning doctors for
medical errors gives doctors an incentive to avoid committing er-
rors,77 it may have other side effects. For example, if doctors be-
come unwilling to share information with one another about their
medical errors for fear that such revelations will be used against
them in malpractice suits, then medical education, in the broadest
sense, and error prevention may become less effective.78
In short, external apology can prompt the disclosure and the in-
vestigation of errors that is needed for preventive measures. A re-
cent report in the New York Times illustrates the relationship
between disclosure and error prevention within a private medical
practice:
Dr. Michael Leonard, an anesthesiologist and chief of surgery
for Kaiser Permanente in Denver, was operating on a cancer
patient a few months ago when he reached into a drawer for
medicine. Inside were two vials, side by side. Both had yellow
labels. Both had yellow caps. One was a paralyzing agent, which
Dr. Leonard had correctly administered to keep the patient still
during the operation. The other was the reversal agent, which he
77. Other factors, such as medical ethics and reputation, also give doctors strong
incentives to avoid committing errors.
78. A parallel argument has been advanced concerning genetic patenting. In the
short run, granting what is in essence a monopoly right for scientific discoveries is a
powerful incentive driving such discoveries. However, if the monopoly rightholder is
stingy in allowing others to license that discovery (and, if the rightholder is a corpora-
tion and its central motive is profits, why shouldn't it be?) or if the transactions costs
(e.g., legal fees) involved in obtaining licenses are prohibitive, the long run effects of
such a legal regime could be socially suboptimal. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCIENCE 698 (May 1, 1998)(suggesting that excessive patenting can produce an
"anticommons" inhibiting overall scientific discovery). See also Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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needed next. "I grabbed the wrong one," Dr. Leonard recalled.
"I used the wrong drug."
It would have been easy for the doctor to keep quiet; the drug
wore off and the patient was not harmed. Instead, he talked -
to the surgeon and scrub nurses, the patient's wife and the hos-
pital pharmacist, who has since relabeled the paralyzing agents
with red stickers and put them in a separate drawer. He also
talked to his five partners, whose reaction unnerved him.
"Four of the five of them said, 'You know, I've done the same
thing,"' Dr. Leonard said. "One of them said, 'I did the same
thing last week.' And I'm thinking, I've been chief of this de-
partment for five years. Now I'm chief of surgery. And nobody
has ever said to me, 'We have this problem.' A lot of it comes
back to this culture of silence."79
Until an organization is willing to admit its errors - and apologiz-
ing by definition involves admitting error - preventing future er-
rors will be difficult.80
II. DIVERGENT INTERESTS
Divergent interests are a second source of complexity regarding
apology in the organizational setting. Below I discuss three salient
features: principal-agent tensions between organizations and their
employees, differences in risk preferences between organizations
and individuals and self-insurance versus third-party insurance by
organizations.
A. Principal-Agent Tensions
An individual who injures another when working as an employee
may ask whether revealing the mistake and apologizing for it will
be in his best interest. However, for the organization, the relevant
utilitarian question is whether apologizing will be in the organiza-
tion's best interest.8' Put differently, will the employee/agent do
79. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Do No Harm: Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Si-
lence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at D1.
80. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1014-15 (discussing definitions of apology).
81. The best reason to apologize is not a simple utilitarian one. A person should
apologize when she has harmed another because it is the right thing to do, rather than
because it is in her own self-interest (e.g., leading the other party to drop the case).
See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1065-67 (discussing ethical concerns regarding apologies
made for strategic purposes). However, when analyzing the principal-agent tension, it
is simplest to focus upon the utilitarian perspective. For characterizations of the utili-
tarian model of choice, see Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, in
CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 54 (1982); Amartya Sen, The Formulation of
Rational Choice, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 385-90 (May 1994). See also Jonathan R. Cohen,
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what is in the organization's/principal's best interest? For example,
throughout the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Bill Clinton may have
refrained from apologizing fully, including fully admitting those
acts, for fear that such admissions would have cost him the Presi-
dency. However, from the viewpoint of the Office of the Presi-
dency, it might have been best for him to apologize fully, because
irrespective of whether he was replaced, the integrity of the Office
would have been upheld.
While principal-agent tensions are prevalent throughout soci-
ety,82 they can be particularly acute in the dispute resolution set-
ting.83 Not only are the interests of agents and principals
commonly at odds in dispute resolution, but the strategic possibili-
ties for interacting with the opposing side can also complicate mat-
ters further. 4 Moreover, economic theory suggests that such
tensions cannot be eliminated fully. We cannot make them disap-
pear, rather the best we can do is address and manage such
tensions.
In many hospitals, a doctor will refrain from revealing his error
to the patient out of fear of adverse consequences, such as an in-
crease in his experience-rated medical malpractice premiums.86
Undoubtedly, part of what induces physicians at the Lexington VA
to reveal their errors, both to patients and to hospital administra-
tors, is that they are largely shielded from personal financial expo-
sure.87 While other factors may still weigh against their reporting
of a mistake, such as risking their reputation or having the mistake
reported to state licensing agencies or the National Practitioner
Data Bank,88 compared to a private physician, a VA physician as-
sumes little personal risk by reporting his own mistakes. At root
the VA system, rather than the individual physician, bears the
Reasoning Along Different Lines: Some Varied Roles of Rationality in Negotiation and
Conflict Resolution, 3 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 111, 111-22 (1998) (arguing that the rec-
ognition of the plurality of roles that reasoning plays is central to understanding nego-
tiation and dispute resolution).
82. See PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
83. See NEGOTIATION ON BEHALF OF OTHERS (Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence
Susskind eds., 1999).
84. See id. at 6-8.
85. See id.
86. For a fine overview of incentives in medical care, see Liang, Patient Injury
Incentives in Law, supra note 34.
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
88. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 2, at 966. On the National Practitioner's
Data Bank, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152 (1999) (section 11132 discusses the re-
porting requirement of sanctions taken by Boards of Medical Examiners).
2000] 1469
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
brunt of the cost of the individual physician's mistake. This pro-
vides an incentive for VA physicians to reveal their mistakes and
apologize for them.
B. Risk Preferences
There are good reasons to suspect that individuals and organiza-
tions have different attitudes toward risk. First, organizations usu-
ally have far greater financial resources than individuals and are
likely to be more risk neutral than individuals toward a given risk.
Second, While a doctor may commit only one serious medical error
a year, the hospital at which he works at may experience scores of
such errors committed by different physicians per year. As a re-
sult, the hospital is able to spread the risks of a given legal strategy,
such as apology, across multiple cases. 89 Both of these reasons sug-
gest that, vis A vis a particular case, the organization is likely to be
more risk neutral than the individual physician.
How does this apply to apology? The implication is not entirely
clear. On the one hand, admitting a mistake and apologizing for it
is a risky step. If the apology is not offered within a "safe" mecha-
nism, such as certain mediations, then the opposing party can use
the admission as proof in court. This suggests that organizations
might be more willing to embrace apology than individuals. On
the other hand, failing to apologize can also be a risky step, poten-
tially destroying an already damaged relationship and resulting in a
prolonged suit or punitive damages that might have been averted
through an apology.90 From an economic perspective, both apolo-
gizing and not apologizing can be seen as gambles. If organizations
tend to be more risk neutral than individuals, one would expect
organizations to embrace apology more often than individuals if
apologizing is riskier than not apologizing.
C. Self-Insurance versus Third-Party Insurance
A distinctive feature of the Lexington VA is that it self-insures.
In contrast to many private hospitals that carry third-party liability
insurance, the VA system does not, but as a large organization di-
rectly bears its liability costs. This too has ramifications regarding
apology, since organizations and their third-party insurers may
have divergent interests concerning apology.
89. This reasoning also applies to claims, such as many private medical malprac-
tice or automobile accident claims that are ultimately paid by insurance companies, as
spreading risks across many cases lies at the heart of the insurance business.
90. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1015-23.
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Though at times an organization that has third-party insurance
will be more willing to apologize than one that self-insures,91 I sus-
pect that self-insurance may actually promote apology overall.
Third-party insurers may give little weight to some of the benefits
of apology that an organization may value. For example, the Lex-
ington VA's embrace of apology helped promote the well-being of
its patients, its internal morale, and its reputation as a caring insti-
tution - all interests that a third-party insurer might very well
disregard.92
Self-insurance also gives the Lexington VA greater control over
its approach for handling errors, including apology, than would
third-party insurance. Most insurance contracts impose upon the
insured a general duty of cooperation with the insurance company
in defense of the claim.93 Some insurance contracts specifically
prohibit the insured from voluntarily assuming liability, a restric-
tion that some courts have taken as a condition precedent to the
contract. 94 Hence, there is an issue of whether a hospital or doctor
might void the insurance coverage by apologizing. The short an-
swer to that question is "probably not,"95 and I know of no case in
which an organization's insurance coverage was voided by apolo-
gizing. However, this concern may still have a chilling effect on the
use of apology by an injurer that carries third-party insurance. 96
91. An organization with third-party insurance may think, "It's the insurance com-
pany, and not we, who will have to pay for the cost of the mistake." Consider one
example. Following a crash off of Nova Scotia in which 229 people were killed, Swis-
sair was forthcoming in assuming responsibility and seeking a settlement in which it
accepted responsibility for compensatory damages provided punitive damages were
dropped. See Hope Yen, Swiss Airline Offers To Pay the Families of 229 Crash Vic-
tims, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Aug. 6, 1999. The fact that Swissair carried
third-party insurance was likely a factor. As Swissair's Chairman Philippe Bruggisser
commented, "We are well insured and able to face [compensation payments.]" AIR-
LINE FIN. NEWS (Mar. 1, 1999).
92. Similarly, in the case of the individual injurer, he may have interests in apolo-
gizing (e.g., protecting his reputation or alleviating his guilt that a third-party insurer
may disregard).
93. See JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, 8 INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 4771 (1981); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CON-
TRACTS § 31.9 (1994).
94. See APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 93, § 4780; 14 COUCH ON INSUR-
ANCE 2D § 51: 22 (rev. ed. 1982).
95. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1025-28.
96. See, e.g., Naneen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention,
61 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 464 (1995) (indicating that concerns, ungrounded in Baden's
view, over increased insurance costs are a factor inhibiting airline companies from
assuming responsibility for injuries). The central concern of Baden's article-that Jap-
anese airline companies have sought to have restrictions on their liability for interna-
tional accidents imposed by the Warsaw Convention removed-is intriguing. While
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With the control of the "purse strings," may come some control not
only over the litigation but the dispute resolution processes that
precede it. I find it noteworthy that in the Toro example, soon af-
ter switching to a policy readily accepting responsibility within me-
diation, Toro switched from third-party insurance to self-insurance.
Third, self-insurance gives an organization a strong incentive to
prevent future errors: the organization itself will have to pay for
them. Therefore, if adopting a policy of apology will help prevent
future errors, a self-insuring organization will be inclined toward it.
Now compare this to an organization that carries third-party insur-
ance. While an organization that carries third-party insurance does
have an incentive to keep its insurance premiums from rising by
preventing errors, having the insurance does reduce the "sting" of
such errors.97 Consider also the interests of the third-party insur-
ance company. After the insurance contract is signed and the pre-
miums are set, reducing future errors is no doubt a good thing.
Fewer errors mean fewer claims payments and hence greater prof-
its for the insurance company. Let us call this "incentive one."
However, before the contract is signed, the insurance company has
no incentive to help reduce future errors. Indeed, if ways could be
found to prevent all future errors, the insurance company would be
out of business for there would be no need to buy insurance. More
generally, if one supposes that an insurance company's profits are
tied to the volume of their business and that this volume is tied to
underlying levels of errors, then an insurance company has little
incentive to promote error reduction. 98 Let us call this "incentive
two."
denial may be a central part of American culture, assuming responsibility for mis-
takes, including apology, is far more prevalent in Japan. For references to the use of
apology internationally, see Cohen, supra note 1, at 1013 n.10. See generally NAOMI
SUGIMOTO, JAPANESE APOLOGY ACROSS DISCIPLINES (1999).
97. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 193-94
(1991).
98. A cynic might argue: "To err is human. To make money off of it is the business
of lawyers and insurers. Thus, both lawyers and insurers benefit because errors oc-
cur." While it goes to far to say that lawyers or insurers actively seek to promote
errors from such interests, perhaps it is right to view such passive beneficiaries and the
systems within which they work with a critical eye. Recall Lincoln's advice, "Discour-
age litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out
to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, expenses and waste of
time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man.
There will still be business enough." Abraham Lincoln, Lecture Notes, in 2 COL-
LECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 81 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). More recently,
some scholars have suggested that legal disputes may have a prisoner's dilemma ele-
ment in which each side is better off getting a lawyer than not, but both sides are
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I do not suggest that incentive two outweighs incentive one.
Rather, I wonder whether incentive two decreases the desire of in-
surance companies to pursue approaches to dispute settlement, in-
cluding apology, that might help prevent future errors as vigorous-
ly as self-insuring organizations. In short, a self-insured organiza-
tion has a clear and direct incentive to prevent future errors and
thus has a strong incentive to use mechanisms like apology. In con-
trast, where an organization buys third-party insurance, the organi-
zation's immediate incentive to avoid errors decreases, and the
insurer's incentives may be mixed. By spreading the responsibility
for errors between the organization and its insurer, some of the
responsibility may get lost in the cracks.
m. NON-PECUNIARY BENEFITS TO CORPORATE MORALE,
PRODUCTIVITY AND REPUTATION
From both positive99 and normative' °° perspectives, it is easy to
conceive of organizations, like corporations, in largely economic
terms. Yet corporations are more than just economic entities.
They are centers of human activity, and as such, are and should be
centers of moral activity too.
Though it is a mistake to envision perfect parallels between indi-
vidual and organizational functioning, limited parallels do exist.
An individual injurer who apologizes may relieve his internal sense
of guilt and increase his self-esteem. Similarly, an organization
that apologizes for errors may bolster its corporate morale. When
Connie Johnson, a quality assurance nurse, states that, "Telling the
truth is the right thing to do," or when Steven Kraman, the hospi-
made worse off when both sides get lawyers. For discussions and references, see Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 510 n.7, 524 n.43
(1994) (suggesting lawyers may actually help solve this prisoner's dilemma).
99. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPI-
TALISM (1985) (arguing that firms arise because contracting to cover all future contin-
gencies in the production process is impractical). For references to both economic
and sociological approaches to understanding organizations and their interaction with
the law, see Marc C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 903 (1996);
Lauren B. Edelman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc.
479 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of A Business is to In-
crease Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (arguing that fidel-
ity to shareholders requires corporate executives to seek profits and disregard broad
conceptions of social responsibility). For a critique of narrow, role-based conceptions
of ethical responsibility, see ARTHUR I. APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE
MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
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tal's chief of staff and chair of its risk management committee,
states that, "Almost every risk manager and attorney says, 'We al-
ways tell the truth,'... But I don't know of any other hospital that
goes out and calls the family when there's been an error[,]" the
pride these people feel in the Lexington VA is apparent.' Such
pride fosters organizational loyalty and productivity. Offering an
apology after an injury is a matter of respect, and treating others
with respect generates self-respect. In the medical setting, the ethi-
cal impetus to apologize for error is even stronger than in other
organizational settings. Medical ethics require that physicians put
the patient's best interests first, and it is hard to imagine many
cases where, having been harmed by the doctor's errors, it is not in
the patient's best interests for the doctor to apologize.
Some benefits associated with apologizing are external to an or-
ganization. For example, offering an apology can enhance an or-
ganization's reputation. Although some organizations would
rather deny responsibility than admit error, other organizations
benefit from embracing responsibility. For example, when the Lex-
ington VA apologized to the Browns, the Browns gladly "came
back" for more business.10 2 Errors happen, and apologizing to cus-
tomers following errors can promote greater customer loyalty and
hence profitability. Goodwill can be a highly valuable corporate
asset. Indeed, non-apology can have a price, and sometimes orga-
nizations may offer apologies because failing to do so would be too
costly. For example, following reports of racism toward its own
employees, Texaco repeatedly apologized publicly for that racism.
While one may wonder whether such apologies were motivated
primarily by sincere contrition or by the fear of losing customers
who might otherwise have perceived Texaco as a racist organiza-
tion and thus opt for non-Texaco products, the fear of losing cus-
tomers was likely one motivating factor.'03
101. See Gerlin, supra note 5.
102. See id. (Of course, the Lexington VA may have remained the best financial
choice for the Browns, but their attitude toward the hospital reflected more than
finances.)
103. See Hanna Rosin, Cultural Revolution at Texaco, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 2,
1998, at 18:
[O]nce the Times story appeared [documenting Texaco's racism], Texaco
CEO Peter Bijur quickly adopted a strategy known in public- relations cir-
cles as "total contrition." With [a] p.r. maven ... at his side, Bijur issued a
series of tortured apologies. "We care about each and every employee," he
said on a satellite broadcast. "I care deeply.... I am sorry for our employ-
ees and both ashamed and angry that such a thing happened in the Texaco
family."
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The internal and external benefits to organizations of assuming
responsibility often go hand in hand. Although apology was not
involved, consider the effects of Johnson & Johnson's responsible
response in the Tylenol poisoning episode. °4 Johnson & Johnson
reacted to reports of poisoning by rapidly pulling Tylenol from re-
tail shelves at a cost to Johnson & Johnson of over $50 million.10 5
Once it was confident the Tylenol supply was safe, Johnson &
Johnson reintroduced the product with added safety features under
the same brand name, rather than under a new brand name as
many had suggested. John H. Bryan, Jr., chairman and chief exec-
utive officer of Sara Lee Corporation, commented,
[C]ommunity responsibility is an important measure of corpo-
rate excellence. By enhancing a company's reputation, it makes
it easier to hire better people, easier to sell products, and easier
to cope with difficult problems. For example, Johnson & John-
son well-deserved reputation as a good corporate citizen un-
doubtedly helped the Tylenol brands survive in the marketplace,
despite the potentially devastating impact of the poisoning
scares.10
6
Johnson & Johnson's responsible handling of the Tylenol episode
seems to have also enhanced its external reputation. Note too that
Johnson & Johnson's response did not occur in an organizational
"vacuum." Instead, its response was consonant with its famed cor-
porate credo of making responsibility to those who use its prod-
ucts, rather than its own profits, the corporation's first priority.10 7
Id. Within two weeks, he turned the nightmare into an opportunity for enlighten-
ment. He met with Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton and asked for their help in making
Texaco a "model of diversity." He bravely shouldered the historical burden. "The
moment is now, and the responsibility is ours to demonstrate to the nation that dis-
crimination can be eradicated. That true inclusion can exist. And that equal opportu-
nity can be provided to every man and woman," he said, sounding totally contrite at a
November 15, 1996, press conference. "We will work ceaselessly and tirelessly, day
after day, to build a company of undisputed opportunity for all individuals." Id.
104. For descriptions, see Tylenol's "Miracle" Comeback, TIME, Oct. 17 1983, at 67
(observing that a year after the poisoning, public confidence was restored); Mark L.
Mitchell, The Impact of External Parieties on Brand-Name Capital. The 1982 Tylenol
Poisonings and Subsequent Cases, ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Oct. 1, 1989, at 601; John B.
Cullen et al., An Ethical Weather Report: Assessing the Organization's Ethical Climate,
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Sept. 22, 1989, at 50.
105. See Tylenol's "Miracle" Comeback, supra note 104.
106. John H. Bryan, Jr., The Corporation and the Executive in the Community, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 695, 697-98. For a list of recent awards Johnson & Johnson has
received for good corporate citizenship, see Johnson & Johnson, Awards and Recogni-
tion (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.johnsonandjohnson.com/whojis-jnj/awards.
html>.
107. The first paragraph of Johnson & Johnson's credo provides:
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Legal expenses paid in compensation of injuries will typically ap-
pear on most organizations' balance sheets. However, many of the
non-pecuniary benefits of apology (e.g., to organizational morale,
loyalty, communication, productivity, reputation, and customer
loyalty) will not typically appear on an organization's balance
sheet. Hence, organizations that overly focus on short-term profits
as reflected in balance sheets may tend to neglect apology. In
some ways, a policy of apologizing for errors is like an investment:
though the immediate price may be clear, the long run economic
benefits, though real, are less defined. If the current CEO cares
primarily about short-run profits, he may "underinvest" in an ap-
proach of apology that may financially benefit a future CEO.
IV. STANDING AND SCOPE
Two issues arising with apology in the organizational setting, but
far less in the individual setting, are standing and scope. 10 8 By
standing, I mean who has the moral authority to apologize. By
scope, I mean what the apology will cover. When an individual
acting on his own commits an injury, generally speaking, both
standing and scope are clear: that individual should apologize to
the extent that he believes himself to be at fault.109 In the organi-
We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to
mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services. In
meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality. We must con-
stantly strive to reduce our costs in order to maintain reasonable prices. Cus-
tomers' orders must be serviced promptly and accurately. Our suppliers and
distributors must have an opportunity to make a fair profit.
Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.johnsonandjohn-
son.com/whojis-jnj/cr_usa.html>. The last paragraph of that credo provides, inter
alia, "Our final responsibility is to our stockholders. Business must make a sound
profit." Id. For a history of that credo, its significance within the organization, and
mention of its influence of the organization's handling of the Tylenol episode, see
Johnson & Johnson, The History of the Johnson & Johnson Credo (visited Mar. 30,
2000) <http://www.johnsonandjohnson.com/who isijnj/crindex.html>. Discussion
of this credo forms an important component of ongoing employee training, especially
among executives, and influenced how the Tylenol episode was handled. See Speech
of David E. Collins, Formerly Member of Executive Committee and Vice Chairman,
Board of Directors, Johnson & Johnson and the employee principally responsible for
the management of the Tylenol crisis (Sept. 23, 1999, Notre Dame Center for Ethics
and Religious Values in Business, South Bend, IN). Perhaps it is not surprising that
Johnson & Johnson, a corporation that had both clearly articulated and regularly ad-
dressed its policy of corporate responsibility, acted so responsibly to the Tylenol
poisoning episode.
108. For factors to consider when making an apology, including standing and scope,
see Cohen, supra note 1, at 1047-52.
109. In some cases, a lawyer or other agent might offer an apology on the individ-
ual's behalf.
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zational setting, standing and scope are less clear. If an employee's
error injures a customer, who should apologize, the employee, the
head of the organization, or an ombudsperson? What should that
person say? In the case of the Lexington VA, Dr. Kraman, the
hospital's chief of staff and chair of the risk management commit-
tee, offered an apology to the injured patient. Is he the right per-
son? Could one argue that the person who committed the error
(e.g., the treating physician) should be the one to apologize? After
all, if Dr., Kraman did not make a mistake, what does he have to
apologize for?
No doubt much will depend upon the particular facts of a situa-
tion, and it is beyond my aim here to fully explore the issues of
standing and scope. Rather, let me suggest two levels at which
these issues ought to be considered: the theoretical and the
practical.
A. Theoretical Level
At the theoretical level, one would think that standing and scope
when making an apology should be tied to an agent's moral culpa-
bility. In the individual case, this means that a person who com-
mits an error should apologize for that error to the extent that he
believes himself at fault, and that, concomitantly, he has no moral
capacity to apologize beyond the extent to which he believes him-
self to be at fault. The organizational context is more complex. In
the organizational context, the injurer's fault can be both mul-
tidimensional and overlapping. The individual injurer may place
the fault upon himself, "If only I had paid more attention the mis-
take would not have occurred." The organization may also see it-
self at fault and think, "We shouldn't have workers on twelve-hour
shifts," or "We should have been more careful in screening those
we hire," or, most generally, "We are responsible for what happens
at our hospital."" 0 Respondeat superior is not just a legal concept
but a moral one: if the individual committed the injury while acting
in his scope as an employee, then the organization bears some re-
sponsibility. As mentioned above, at the Lexington VA, apologies
are typically offered by Dr. Kraman rather than by the individual
110. The first two statements ("we shouldn't have workers on twelve-hour shifts"
and "we should have been more careful in screening who we hired") point to system-
atic errors. The latter statement ("we are responsible for what happens at our hospi-
tal") does not point to a systemic error but simply represents a broad understanding
of organizational responsibility.
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who made the error. While this practice might be critiqued,"' per-
haps this policy stems in part from a broad understanding of orga-
nizational responsibility.
B. Practical Level
Practical considerations also bear upon who should make an
apology. Consider the case where the error is caused by an individ-
ual physician's mistake. At the Lexington VA, Dr. Kraman and
Attorney Hamm suggest that the main reason to have Dr. Kraman
rather than the erring physician apologize is practical: If the indi-
vidual physician attends the face-to-face meeting with the patient,
emotions tend to run very high, both on the part of the patient and
on the part of the physician, and easily obstruct settlement.112 In
contrast, if the physician is absent, emotions tend to be much
"cooler," thus settlement is facilitated." 3 Consider also the com-
mon case where following the injury, the organization discharges
the injuring employee. That employee may be unwilling to apolo-
gize to the injured party, and if the organization wants to apologize
to that party, it must select someone else to offer the apology. The
scope and content of that apology will be quite different than had
the injurer apologized directly, but the apology may still be of
much value.
V. POLICY ARTICULATION
While many individuals are highly reflective about how they
should respond when they have injured another, few ever formally
articulate a policy about it. 1 4 Generally speaking, there is no need.
Even if the individual consciously decides on a particular approach,
111. Albert Wu has critiqued the Lexington VA's practice, suggesting that the indi-
vidual who made the error should offer the apology. See Wu, supra note 2, at 971.
112. Some may say that allowing strong emotions such as shame and anger to be
released is ultimately helpful and hence that it is good when high emotions accom-
pany apology rather than being buried or avoided. Yet such intense emotions may
sometimes interfere with reaching a settlement, and, if reaching settlement is the goal,
using agents can be helpful. For barriers to conflict resolution generally, see BARRI-
ERS TO CoNFLIcr RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). For a discussion of
the use of agents to at times overcome such barriers, see NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF
OF OTHERS, supra note 84; Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, When Should We
Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative Negotiation, 4 NEGOTIATION J. 4, 395, 395-401
(1988).
113. Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
114. Some individuals look for advice, such as psychological or religious prescrip-
tions, about how to act when they have injured another, but that is quite different
from articulating their own policies.
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he can simply follow it without formally expressing it. Yet the situ-
ation is different with organizations. Organizations regularly artic-
ulate a variety of policies, for unlike individuals, organizations
often need to formally articulate policies to implement them. Fur-
ther, organizations are also more likely than individuals to commit
multiple injuries over time, and the policies that they adopt may
receive multiple applications.
From the viewpoint of a scholar studying dispute resolution, the
ideal scenario would be if an organization formally articulated a
policy, implemented that policy, collected data on the effects of
that policy, and then formally revised that policy in light of the
data. In such an ideal world, policies toward dispute resolution
would undergo iterative design and development. Our world, how-
ever, is far muddier than that. Consider the experience of the Lex-
ington VA. Following two large, adverse verdicts in 1985 and 1986,
and also shortly after hiring Dr. Kraman and Attorney Hamm," 5
the Lexington VA implemented a new approach of assuming re-
sponsibility, including apology and a fair offer of settlement. Yet,
in part due to bureaucratic complexities of working within the VA,
a large government system,116 this approach was not formally ar-
ticulated as a hospital policy until 1999. In other words, the reality
preceded the writing by more than a decade.
This suggests two questions: (i) to what extent is an organiza-
tion's actual approach consistent with its articulated policy, and (ii)
to what extent does policy articulation influence actual organiza-
tional behavior? It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to re-
solve such questions here. Let me simply suggest several
considerations. Regarding the first question, organizations fre-
quently articulate policies that members do not follow. For exam-
ple, many hospitals have ethical guidelines calling for the reporting
of medical errors, but medical errors often go unreported. 1 7 Sec-
ond, the fact that policies are not always followed does not mean
that the articulation of a policy has no influence. Articulating a
policy may help an organization to follow it. For example, part of
what influenced Johnson & Johnson to handle the 'Tylenol poison-
ing episode so responsibly was its credo." 8 Similarly, the Lexing-
115. See Telephone Interviews with Kraman, Hamm & Johnson, supra note 4.
116. See id. Note, too, that the formal policy articulation in November 1999 slightly
preceded the publication of Kraman & Hamm's study. See Kraman & Hamm, supra
note 2.
117. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 74; To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 69, at 74-93 (dis-
cussing existing error-reporting systems and recommending reforms).
118. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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ton VA may now feel more bound to follow the approach of
assuming responsibility now that it has formally articulated that
policy. Articulating a policy can be a form of self-constraint at the
institutional level.119 Though it may not work perfectly, it may still
have some bite.
CONCLUSION
The approach of the Lexington VA to medical errors over the
past decade provides a glimpse of the potential of apology in the
setting. In this paper, I have discussed the following issues con-
cerning organizational apology: (i) the process of learning to pre-
vent future errors; (ii) the divergent interests related to principal/
agent tensions between organizations and their employees, risk
preferences and sources of insurance; (iii) the non-pecuniary bene-
fits to corporate morale, productivity and reputation; (iv) the
standing and scope when apologizing; and (v) the effects of policy
articulation.
Before ending, let me underscore several points. First, I do not
suggest that under the current legal and economic arrangements,
all organizations can adopt the approach of assuming responsibility
for injuries, including apology, with financial consequences similar
to the Lexington VA's. The legal and economic arguments gov-
erning VA hospitals and their employees, as well as the VA's his-
torical relationship with its members, differ from those typical in
the private sector.120  Further, the medical setting has features,
119. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUB.
INTEREST 94-118 (Summer 1980); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES
IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
120. Unlike the Lexington VA example, the private sector often presents the com-
plexity of multiple defendants with multiple sources of insurance. Such multifaceted,
structural differences between legal and economic incentives within the VA system as
compared to private medical practice may help support arguments for multifaceted,
structural reform of the latter. For example, if legal and economic incentives discour-
age private physicians from apologizing when they make errors, a question arises of
whether structural reforms should be undertaken to change those incentives. See To
ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 69, at 3 ("A comprehensive approach to improving pa-
tient safety is needed. This approach cannot focus on a single solution since there is
no 'magic bullet' that will solve this problem, and indeed, no single recommendation
in this report should be considered the answer. Rather, large, complex problems re-
quire thoughtful, multifaceted responses."). Consider, too, the prevalence of apology
under Britain's system of nationalized health coverage. See Frances H. Miller, Medi-
cal Malpractice Litigation: Do the British Have a Better Remedy? 11 AM. J. L. & MED.
433, 434-35 (1986) (describing how nationalized health care has fostered the markedly
lower incidence of malpractice suits and much greater role of apology in cases of
medical error in Great Britain); see also Charles Vincent et al., supra note 50.
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such as pre-existing relationships between doctors and patients and
an ethic of care, not found in many other contexts. Rather, exper-
iences of organizations like the Lexington VA, the Toro Company
and Johnson & Johnson suggest that, if only from a financial view-
point, the approach of assuming responsibility for mishaps - at
times even including apology - is worthy of much broader organi-
zational consideration. Many lawyers fear that apology will inevi-
tably produce financial ruin. The experience of the Lexington VA
helps disprove that claim and thus shifts the discourse. From the
financial viewpoint, the question is no longer whether the approach
of assuming responsibility including apology can be economically
viable, if not profitable, rather the question is where and when.
Second, this Article has considered the economic ramifications
of apology, because much of the skepticism toward apology is
rooted in economic concerns. I do not suggest, however, that
adopting the approach of assuming responsibility, including apol-
ogy, to injuries should be evaluated solely, or even largely, on eco-
nomic terms. There is more to life than profits and more to
apology than the economics of it. An apology is meant to show
regret, and an insincere apology that is motivated by economic fac-
tors alone, rather than by internal remorse, is little apology indeed.
Whether or not it is profitable to do so, individuals and organiza-
tions have moral obligations to apologize when they have injured
another. Assuming responsibility is not just a matter of economics
but of ethics.
Third, the above discussion of special issues concerning apology
in the organizational context is a theoretical exploration. For ex-
ample, I make no claim that by adopting an approach of assuming
responsibility, including apology, an organization will necessarily
decrease future errors, bolster corporate morale or ultimately ben-
efit financially. The experience of the Lexington VA is but one
"data point." Rather than drawing deductive conclusions, my goal
has been to inspect that "data point" closely and to use it as a lens
for offering conjectures about some central dimensions of organi-
zational apology. Evaluating such conjectures awaits future
research.
When social systems are awry, it is easy to lose sight of the way
things should be. In some respects, our current medical system, so
driven by economics and the fear of malpractice liability that doc-
tors are afraid to apologize to patients when they have made er-
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rors, is a system gone awry.12 1 The Lexington VA took a
courageous step in adopting the approach of assuming responsibil-
ity, including apology, for errors. There was no doubt that this pol-
icy would better serve its patients. How good it is to see that it was
also financially sound. Perhaps their experience can serve as an
impetus for other organizations to consider embarking on similar
paths.
121. The same can be said of how injuries are handled generally within our society,
with injurers frequently focused on avoiding, rather than accepting, responsibility.
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